bmdyy / pmat-final

PMAT Final Assessment

Final Assessment

Target: X-X.BonusBinaries\Malware.unknown.exe.malz

Summary:

This sample exfiltrates cosmo.jpeg from the user's desktop via DNS requests and then exits. No files are written/modified, no commands are run, and no forms of persistence seem to be in place.

Basic Static Analysis

• MD5: 812A7C7EB9D7A4332B9E166AA09284D7
• SHA1: EC0D565AFE635C2C7863B2A05DF8A49C58B703A3
• SHA256: 81A10784AE60A58A969E858C9C4A2AE0D4EBE46E9BD6776992461C062F70099D
• Size: ~124 KB
• Flagged by 3/69 vendors on VirusTotal
• 32-bit executable

λ floss -n 8 Malware.unknown.exe > floss.txt

This is very likely a Nim binary:

λ grep -i 'nim' floss.txt | head
fatal.nim
fatal.nim
parseutils.nim
strutils.nim
streams.nim
setPositionImpl
getPositionImpl
oserr.nim
<SNIP>

File path Desktop\cosmo.jpeg is hardcoded into the binary:

λ grep -i \\ floss.txt
@Desktop\cosmo.jpeg

Some DLL files appear as strings in the binary:

λ grep -i '\.dll' floss.txt               
@Can't load inet_ntop proc from Ws2_32.dll
@Ws2_32.dll                               
@Ws2_32.dll                               
@Bcrypt.dll                               
@Bcrypt.dll                               
KERNEL32.dll                              
msvcrt.dll                                
USER32.dll                                

What looks like three obfuscated domains:

λ grep -i 'l.o.c.a.l' floss.txt
@hwtwtwpw:w/w/whwewyw.wywowuwuwpw.wlwowcwawlw
@axuxtxhx.xnxsx.xlxoxcxaxlx
@.BcBoBsBmBoBsBfBuBrBbBoBoBtBsBeBmBpBoBrBiBuBmB.BlBoBcBaBlB

The three strings turn into:

• http://hey.youup.local
• auth.ns.local
• .cosmosfurootsemporium.local

Basic Dynamic Analysis

When run, the sample looks up hey.youup.local:

If no response is received for hey.youup.local, the program quits:

If hey.youup.local is up, the program continues running and repeatedly sends GET requests to http://hey.youup.local:

This continue until hey.youup.local "goes down", at which point there is a DNS lookup request to auth.ns.local and then DNS exfiltration begins using .cosmosfurootsemporium.local:

Note: To recreate:

1. Modify FlareVM's hosts file to point hey.youup.local to localhost
2. Run inetsim on REMnux
3. Start a Python http.server on FlareVM to receive the first HTTP request and then close it to initiate DNS exfiltration

It appears that the DNS requests are exfiltrating Desktop\cosmo.jpeg:

Once it finishes exfiltrating Desktop\cosmo.jpeg, the sample exits:

If Desktop\cosmo.jpeg does not exist, the sample exits:

Advanced Static Analysis

The program appears to be obfuscated, making use of a very large number of functions making it very hard and tiring to trace:

Since we already know what this binary does, I won't bother getting into advanced dynamic analysis, especially given the obfuscation in place.

YARA Rule

The following YARA rule may be used to detect the sample on a computer:

rule DNS_Exfil_Cosmo_JPEG {
    
    meta: 
        last_updated = "2023-03-05"
        author = "William Moody"
        description = "Detects (X-X.BonusBinaries) Malware.unknown.exe"

    strings:
		$cosmoPath = "Desktop\\cosmo.jpeg" ascii
		$nim = "nim"
		$PE_magic_byte = "MZ"
		$d1 = "hwtwtwpw:w/w/whwewyw.wywowuwuwpw.wlwowcwawlw" ascii
		$d2 = "axuxtxhx.xnxsx.xlxoxcxaxlx" ascii
		$d3 = ".BcBoBsBmBoBsBfBuBrBbBoBoBtBsBeBmBpBoBrBiBuBmB.BlBoBcBaBlB" ascii

    condition:
        ($PE_magic_byte and $nim)
		and $cosmoPath
		and ($d1 and $d2 and $d3)
}

Example output:

λ yara64 rule.yara -r C:\ -w -p 32
DNS_Exfil_Cosmo_JPEG C:\\Users\flarevm\Desktop\Malware.unknown.exe